confucian beliefs

‘When Confucianism Meets Christianity’ Lecture- 儒家与基督教在

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In 2013, Professor Stanley Jiadong Zheng delivered a lecture on the relationship between Confucianism and Christianity. Exploring what difficulties followers of both traditions might encounter, Zheng discusses new ways of understanding the encounter between the two traditions and how this might impact on academic, theologian, and practitioner perspectives.

Co-sponsored by the Centre for Asian Theology, Interchurch-Interfaith Program Team, Toronto Southeast Presbytery & Emmanuel College.

Beyond the Headlines: Chinese Cultural Values and Tourism Behaviour 中国文化价值观与旅游行为

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In the past decade, Chinese tourists have made international headlines for all the wrong reasons. From setting fire to curtains inside aeroplane cabins to hurdling noodles over flight attendants, news publications have repeatedly asked ‘Why are Chinese tourists so badly behaved?’. Following a quick online search, it is not uncommon to come across articles that list the top 10 most embarrassing Chinese tourists moments or personal recounts of bad Chinese tourist experiences. As one restaurant owner stated in an Aljazeera news report: “They don’t say hello, they don’t speak French, they don’t speak English…One woman came in here and spat on the floor.”

Chinese Tourism

Image: Maxxelli Consulting (2014). Understanding China’s Outbound Tourism. Retrieved June 4th, 2017 from here.

With one in ten travellers worldwide coming from China, however, these reports ignore the significant impact that Chinese tourists have on businesses worldwide. As the World Tourism Organisation reported in 2013, with an increase of 70 million tourists travelling beyond China since 2000, Chinese tourists spent US$102 billion overseas in 2012 alone, making China the world’s biggest spender on foreign travel. Despite these figures, opinion articles that make general assumptions about Chinese tourists as rude, uncultured and ill-mannered reveal that the majority of Chinese tourists are misrepresented and unknown to foreign publics. As academics in hospitality and tourism management Fu, Cai and Lehto (2017) note, there is even a lack of understanding in the literature on what drives the Chinese to travel, and how culture can influence the behaviour of tourists abroad.

The main problem is that while Chinese tourist motivations have been frequently explored, most research has relied on Western paradigms and frameworks that use existing dimensions and terms, such as prestige, romance, and autonomy (Fu et al., 2017), to frame what Chinese tourists desired most or expected to gain from their travel experience. Without completely contrasting Chinese tourist behaviour with their Western equivalents, Fu et al. (2012) state that it needs to be recognised that many Chinese travellers display characteristics driven by their cultural roots. As theorists such as Max Webber (1951) and Geert Hofstede (1980) argued decades before, this means that Chinese people are strongly influenced by the teachings of Confucius (551-479 BC).

Whether this refers to valuing concepts such as ren 仁, which can be understood as “tolerance, forgiveness, deference, filial obedience (to parents), faithfulness (to master), wisdom…” (Lu, 1983, p. 29); the moral force of li 礼, which governs correct and appropriate behaviours in relationships; or xin 信 as representative of sincerity and trustworthiness, the individual in Chinese culture is never an individual in the Western sense. Each self in Confucianism is part of a human relationship where individuals are obligated to act and treat others according to Confucian virtues. Fulfilling these obligations adds to the growth and structure of the self, which ultimately builds a stable social and political structure of the state (Kwek & Lee, 2010).

As “one of the most prominent and enduring cultural influences within the East Asian region” (Ng & Lee, 2014, p. 150), Confucianism may provide a cultural backdrop to explain motivational drivers for tourists. In recent years, two main studies were conducted to test whether Confucianism did play a role in influencing the behaviour and motivation of Chinese tourists. The first was a qualitative report where Kwek and Lee (2010) from Griffith University interviewed and observed Mainland Chinese nationals visiting Australia on a corporate/leisure trip. The total participants in the study consisted of 10 guided tours of 64 people, of whom 55 were male and nine were females. For Fu, Cai and Lehto’s (2017) quantitative report, a scale was developed that applied Confucian life domains of self, family, social life, society, and nature to a survey questionnaire that was tested on 507 Chinese residents in Hangzhou who had taken leisure trips prior to the sampling period.

Both studies had similar results: the primary motivation for tourists was to achieve harmony, whether with nature or in existing relationships. While harmony is identified in other motivational frameworks (Pearce & Lee, 2005), maintaining harmony for these tourists has to be understood within a Chinese context. For example, ancient Chinese philosophies like Daoism and Confucianism have long held the view that humans and nature are a unified entity, which diverges from the subject-object relationship between culture and nature in the West (Tang, 2015). As a result, seeking harmony with nature is not a surprising theme in China’s tourism tradition and goes beyond aesthetic appreciation to a means of pursuing wisdom by enjoying simplicity. On harmony within relationships, the majority of Kwek and Lee’s participants noted the importance of avoiding conflict and seeking harmony within group settings (p. 137). As one Chinese tourist from Beijing commented:

“The Chinese people have, for centuries, cultivated the habit to strive for harmony in every situation and as long as everyone is happy, we are also happy to oblige” (Male, early-50s, businessman).

Harmony here refers to peace, acting in an appropriate manner, and having good relationships with others. Given the hierarchical and collectivist aspect of Chinese social settings, harmonious relationships function as a way of promoting personal connections and social norms, such as loyalty and obligation (Chen & Chen, 2004).

Other themes that emerged when observing how Chinese tourists behaved included respect for authority and conformity. In every corporate/leisure tour group for instance, a leader who held the highest social status would take charge in making decisions for the group. To show respect, Kwek and Lee write that members would always look towards the leader for directions and decisions as a way of protecting his or her social face. Whether this involved choosing a restaurant or what activities to do next, members would suppress their personal preferences to conform to the interests of the leader so as not to appear ‘deviant’ (p. 134). Although there are some setbacks to Chinese vertical relationships, including overconcentrating power at the top and leaving little or no room for group initiatives, the underlying idea of respecting authority is to maintain harmony and avoid conflict at all costs.

Finally, in terms of motivations or what Chinese tourists sought to get out of their trip, family togetherness was rated as the second-highest motivation factor (Fu et al., 2017). In that sense, whether touring as a group or in a family setting, maintaining integrity in relationships and developing bonds with others is what influenced why Chinese tourists travelled and how they were expected to behave abroad.

While limited to only two studies, these findings show more to the behaviour and action of Chinese tourists than what reaches the headlines, and provide valuable information for industry practitioners interested in developing desirable vacation experiences to Chinese tourists, particularly when translated into marketing and promotional guidelines. Promoting the potential of a destination should emphasise personal and relationship goals of Chinese tourists and how places can fulfil motivational needs. In the regional context as well, Confucianism as a cultural tradition goes beyond mainland China and includes locations such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Singapore. Developing a deeper understanding of what drives Confucian-heritage societies could become a lucrative market base as most of these growing middle-class markets have a propensity to spend on travel (Fu et al., 2017).

For academia, these studies also show the importance of trying to understand phenomena from a non-Western perspective, especially when Western theories and frameworks are not suitable to discuss non-Western settings. As one of the major philosophies of Chinese culture that influences the social and political dynamics of Chinese society as well as the personal and social dynamics of everyday life, understanding Chinese tourist behaviour and motivations from a Confucian background provides a greater understanding of the relationship between culture and tourism.

Book Extract- Lessons From History: Legalists vs. Confucianists 历史的经验与教训: 儒法之争

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The New Legalist

The following text is an extract from the book The New Legalist Vol. 1 (2010) compiled by independent scholars and chief editor of the New Legalist website Sherwin Lu, and contract research fellow of the Centre for Chinese and Global Affairs, Peking University Yuzhong Zhai.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the Confucian Weekly Bulletin. The extract is from the chapter Eastern Wisdom Can Help Solve Today’s Global Problems: A study of the “dynamically-balanced multi-dimensional whole” worldview (p. 262), raising interesting points about the relationship between Legalism and Confucianism, and the relevance of China’s philosophies to today’s world problems.

“The Chin dynasty ended with a conspiracy at the top on the death of the First Emperor, whose successor, one of his sons, betrayed his father’s Legalist policy by distorting the rule of law and triggered rebellion by the people. But Chin’s Legalist policy was largely revived and continued during the next dynasty of Han. In the later years of the Han dynasty, Confucianist ideology gradually got the upper hand and was finally authorized as the sole guiding system of thought for running the country. Confucianist doctrine had ever since remained the orthodox ideology in China till the 1911 Revolution, though some Legalist practices had been carried on and other Legalist ideas were adopted sometimes by reformist statesman and sometimes at the beginning of a new dynasty on replacing an old, corrupted one.

Why was Legalism defeated by Confucianism in Chinese history? The answer is in the inconsistency in Legalist practice due to the limit of historical conditions. The major inconsistencies are: The social merit system failed to cover the selection of the top ruler (king/emperor)- the throne was still inherited by royals on, and the all-society mutual supervision system failed to reach the one or two most powerful men under the king/emperor on the topmost level of the hierarchical ladder. Therefore, when a Legalist emperor died, the state power could easily be shifted, either through conspiracy or through the work of time, into the hands of weak or morally depraved succeeding emperors and/or power-hungry top-ranking officials, who placed their own interests above those of the people and would not bother to take the pains, as required by Legalist principles, to do the regulating of social life against the strong oppositions from some special interest groups, especially when there were no more threats of rivalry from outside. This inconsistency can only be corrected by a democratic system based on the modern principle of people’s sovereignty, corrected in a way in which the institutional power of the state exercised from the top down and people’s power exercised from the bottom up remain in a constant dynamic balance.

However, except from that loophole, the legalist theories and practices in ancient China were quite successful. The most important lesson from these theories and practices is that, especially at a time of “warring states”, the only way for a people to survive and prosper is to have a strong state under the constant watch of the people and with the institutional power to implement a comprehensive series of social, economic, political and other policies which aim at regulating all different kinds of social relationships towards a dynamic balance between all different interest groups and different aspects of social life, including a constant dynamic balance between the institutional power of the state and people’s sovereignty. And to do this, the atomistic world view, both in its ancient Chinese version, i.e., the Confucianist orthodoxy (except for some of its teachings on the cultivation of personal and socio-political virtue), and in its modern vision, i.e., the Liberalist laissez faire ideology, must be repudiated.

The atomistic pattern of thought looks at society as a mechanical aggregation of millions or hundreds of millions of individual human beings each pursuing his/her own interests. According to this view, the will and interests of a state equal the sum total of all its individual members’ wills and interests. It disregards the fact that the state, as a special kind of social group of human beings, can also have its relatively independent will and interests which can in turn affect the will and interests of each individual member and all other social groups, large or small, within and outside of it. The historical argument between the Legalists and the Confucianists regarding the management of state affairs is a typical case.

The Legalists emphasize the importance of the rule of Law, insisting that, so long as the social law originates in and in line with Tao, i.e., the law of Nature, it will cultivate and fortify virtue in all people and thus ensure a good order for the society, while Confucianists preach that personal cultivation of family virtue based on kinship principles will guarantee social justice, because, according to them, if all people behave virtuously towards others in the “extended family” of the big society. The Confucianists failed to see the family virtue cannot be naturally extended beyond the scope of the family and readily applied to all social relationships because the cultivation of family virtues is based partially on natural kinship feelings and partially on a kind of intuitive perception of people being mutually interdependent, a direct perception by all five senses which is possible only within such a limited circle of “face-to-face” relationships as a family. Beyond this limit, people need extra impetus and motivation, i.e., the rule of law, or the reward and punishment system on the social scale, for the nurturing of social values.

Confucianists also opposed the state’s owning some economic enterprises which were critical to national economy and people’s livelihoods and setting by a large enough quantity of commodity wealth as a necessary financial leverage for regulating the market and other aspects of social life to defend people’s peaceful life from external and internal dangers.

As social atomists deny the necessity of a dynamic balance between the collective entity and the individuals, they inevitably advocate a policy that indulges the advantaged, permitting them to get the upper hand over the disadvantaged. And this policy inevitably results in the split of a society into “two nations”: the privileged versus the underprivileged, and this is the root cause of all social upheavals, mass violence and war. It is the case with the old China under the ideological domination of Confucianism, as well as with today’s world divided into the super rich handful and the poor majority all over the world. In Chinese history, whenever advocates of Confucianist ideas of “virtue” were loudest, it must be a time when social conflicts were approaching a crisis, as was pointed out by Lao Tzu in his Tao Te Ching. Can’t we draw a lesson from history and apply it to a truthful understanding of the world situation today?”

To read more about the Legalist perspective, see the New Legalist website here.

Understanding Metaphor in Confucius and Aristotle 隐喻的比较研究

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Qianlong

Image: Norton Museum (2011). Qianlong Meritorious Servitior. Retrieved April 20, 2017 from here.

Native speakers of all languages commonly use metaphor when communicating about the world (Lakcoff & Johnson, 1980). While such metaphorically used words and expressions vary across different languages and times, metaphor “opens up a whole new world of meaning…(allowing) each individual to add colour and detail to the picture it draws” (Bergmann, 2008, p. 219). Metaphors do this by inviting readers to make inferences about how two different things could be alike.

For example, the interpretation of the Shakespearean phrase “Juliet is the sun” is dependent on one’s knowledge and experience of the sun: as an awesome sight, warm, and vital to life. Instead of providing a direct comparison (“Juliet is like the sun”), the metaphor casts on the subject ideas and associations of the sun so that Juliet, like the sun, is understood in the way that Romeo sees her, highlighting what Rina Marie Camus (2017) calls “perspectival thinking of the subject” (p. 4) or ways of seeing things from another’s point of view. While providing new ways of seeing things, metaphors also relate to common phrases and experiences, reinforcing how communities and groups use “socially shared way(s) of thinking” (Stern, 2000, p. 131).

In comparative studies, many authors including Yu Jiyuan (2010) and Edward Slingerland (2011) have examined shared metaphors between Confucian and Aristotelian texts. However, unlike Yu and Slingerland who assume that metaphors are used to create the same images and meanings between texts, supporting the theory that metaphors are valid across time, space, and culture and ultimately derive from common bodily experiences, Camus argues that metaphors are ‘context-sensitive’. That is, they are based on images whose configuration and resonance heavily depend on a larger context of traditions that use that metaphor. Camus focuses on archery as her main example.

Early Chinese thinkers have often used archery as a metaphor when discussing ethics. Scholar and poet Yan Xiong, for instance, stated:

“Cultivate character (xiushen) and let it be your bow. Rectify your thoughts and let them be your arrows. Establish appropriateness (yi) as your target. Settle, aim, and let the arrows fly. You are certain to “hit the mark” (zhong).” (Yangzi Fayan, 3.1)

While the bow is a common aspect of ancient cultures, archery in China has long been related to military skill, moral behaviour, and good political governance. As Sinologist Cecilia Lindqvist states in her book China: Empire of Living Symbols, the character for bow is a common symbol on graves from the late Zhou era, and can also be found on oracle bones and bronzes. Early classics such as the Book of Documents and the Book of Odes also feature references to archery, creating strong associations between the bow and political authority by recurring mention of archery contests.

Given the commonality of archery in early Chinese culture, it is not surprising that bow metaphors are used in the Confucian text The Analects to highlight practices of morality. In the translated version by James Legge, a passage of The Analects states:

“There is nothing that gentlemen compete over (zheng), if at all, it is in archery…when ascending to the shooting platform and upon descending offering drink- such competition is truly of gentlemen.” (3.7)

While making sense on the literal level, the passage can also be read as a comparison of the archers and the gentleman, where both figures interact properly with peers according to correct ritual. For Camus (2017), more substance can be drawn from this passage by noting the audience being addressed in this passage – young men being groomed for office, and the political strife during the Warring States period in which the passage is set.

Considering that archery contestants were expected to bow to their opponents before and after shooting turns, while wine was offered to losers who were obliged to drink (Selby, 2000), the passage would have generated images of friendly relations, kindness towards inferiors, and the importance of accepting one’s fate, inviting rulers and ministers to think about right conduct and the life of subordinates.

In this sense, understanding the meaning of associations by referring to contextual information can help clarify passages of ancient texts for modern interpreters. For The Analects passage 3.7, respectful behaviour of archers was an easy way of summing up Confucius’ perspective on moral governance as it appealed to experiences that were publicly accessible and well-known (Stern, 2000).

Unlike in China, archery was less valued in ancient Greece. While the bow was used in Greek mythology and the epic tales of Crotus the Archer, and Hyacinth the lover of Apollo who became accomplished when he learnt how “to shoot with a bow…and also to play the lyre” (See, 2014, p. 93), archery was never seen in great athletic competitions like the Olympics. As Historian Waldo E. Sweet (1987) notes, “the feeling seemed to be that it was a cowardly weapon, with which a weak man could kill a brave warrior at a distance” (p. 177).

With later developments in Greece’s military history however, archery became a utilized weapon in warfare and territorial patrol. State-sponsored physical education, which trained young men to become well-regarded citizens, also featured archery (Wooyeal & Bell, 2004).

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle appeals to the sport in his discussion on achieving good:

“Surely, then, knowledge of the good must be very important for our lives? And if, like archers, we have a target, are we not more likely to hit the right mark? Is so, we must try at least roughly to comprehend what it is and which science or faculty is concerned with it” (Passage 1.2, line 1094a)

In her discussion, Camus (2017) notes that the metaphor fixes attention on the participants of moral inquiry who are compared to archers posed to strike. The ethicist aims at the Good which symbolises the target, while the means to the target symbolised by the arrow is knowledge. The familiarity with archery practices and events would have resonated with the original audiences and made for a dramatized explanation of the importance of reaching the aim. Success in the inquiry was just as important for ethical individuals and communities as it was for archers’ lives and state security (Camus, 2017).

While common themes arise between the use of archery as a metaphor in Confucius and Aristotle, including moral striving, the preparation of young men as civic subjects, and physical activity as a component of moral life, the relevance of this metaphor is based on different sets of images and inferences.

For Confucius, archers were a prototype for gentlemanly behaviour as rituals and right conduct were ways of fostering necessary traits for leaders. Rather than focusing on the act of shooting, The Analects passages on archery relate to the life and conduct of a gentleman (that is, a morally noble person) in power.

The Aristotelean text, on the other hand, highlights that archery relates to the nature of ethical inquiry and excellence. The virtuous agent is like the skilled archer in that the rightness of his deeds are like the arrows that hit the mark. The emphasis in this sense is on the aim of the bow rather than the rituals and processes around the act of shooting. Further, a later passage in the Nicomachean Ethics (10.7) highlights a more complete understanding of happiness that goes beyond acts that are aimed at some end, showing “the limits of archery as metaphor for excellence and happiness” (Camus, 2017, p. 16).

In that case, despite being used as a common expression across ancient periods, Camus’s article shows that understanding the context of metaphors can reveal more about the meaning and intention of ancient passages than previously thought.

Chinese Military Ethics from a Confucian Perspective 儒家与战争

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Military

Image: See here.

With the rapid development of China’s military forces throughout the 1990s and 2010s, academia has paid increasing attention to Chinese military ethics and international politics (Di Cosmo, 2009; Stalnaker, 2012; Zhang, 2012; Lo & Twiss, 2015). From a Confucian perspective, the emphasis on humanity and ethical behaviour has often meant that war has been viewed as an abnormal social phenomenon that is caused by blinded human nature: “war disappears with the guidance of humanness, love, and good deeds” (Yu, 2016, p. 265). Thus, despite the focus on just war theory in classical Chinese war strategy, many scholars have argued that Confucianism does not have much to say about war other than that war should be abolished, and the Great Unity of the world developed (Pecorino, 2001).

However, according to Yi-Ming Yu from the National Defence University in Taiwan, rereading classic Confucian texts reveals that Confucianism does discuss ethics in warfare, and has played a significant role in wars that impacted China’s development. Indeed, as Fuchuan Yao states in his article War and Confucianism, while humanism may be true in theory there were more wars and chaos when Confucianism became the recognised political thought in China. It should therefore “bear some, if not prime, responsibility for the vicious circles of war and chaos” (p. 214). On the other hand, Yao’s comments- that Chinese people suffered from the Confucian political context where a history of war, famine, and revolution killed millions of people- may not be enough to conclude that there is a direct correlation between war and Confucianism. For example, Liu (2001) states that it was corruption and despotism that led to the stagnation of Chinese society and the vicious circles of order and disorder, while Ruiping Fan (1997) highlights that Confucianism was misinterpreted and propagated to serve totalitarian rulers.

Despite this, rereading classic Confucian texts does show that Confucianism can be used as a way of understanding Chinese military strategy and ethics in warfare. As Rigel (2014) notes, examining selected Chinese resources that discuss war and ethics has a very long tradition (see, for example, Master Sun’s The Art of War).

From a top-down point of view, the Confucian text The Great Learning states that the ultimate goal of all individuals is to accomplish world order and peace. Based on different translations, this may mean that individuals should either achieve world peace or pacify the world (Cheng, 1991; Jiang & Jiang, 2012). In that case, for the ruler to be a ruler (“The Analects”, 12:11), the Son of Heaven would have a moral duty to pacify the world for the sake of world peace even if war became an imperative means to obtain or maintain that goal (Chen, 2007). So, even though violence and war would not be considered as the primary means of establishing peace, in cases where force is required to maintain stability or pacify a threat, warfare would be permissible.

Furthermore, the Confucian scholar Mencius is recorded to have said:

“Chieh and Chou lost their empires because they lost the people and they lost the people because they lost the hearts of the people. There is a way to win the empire … It is to collect for them what they like and do not do to them what they do not like, that is all” (Mencius 4A: 9).

For “if the king makes a grave mistake, an advice should be given. If the king does not listen repeatedly, he should be removed.” (Mencius 5B: 9).

Both of these passages reveal that to maintain long-term harmony, citizens should overthrow rulers who do not govern with Heaven’s Mandate. That is, rulers who do not express virtue through the humane care of their people. In that case, because “there is no ethical warrant prohibiting the overthrow of such a ruler” (Ivanhoe, 2004, p. 272), if necessary the non-ren ruler (that is, one who lacks humaneness or benevolence) should be ousted by means of force. According to Kung and Ma (2013), it is this Confucian doctrine that has always been used to justify the removal of cruel despots throughout China’s history, leading to a tradition of peasant rebellions in the last 260 years of China’s dynastic rule.

This line of thought is considered to deviate from traditional Confucianism where war only results in further violence and social turmoil (see The Analects 12:19), as even if the state wins land by war it loses the support of the people considering that people face the most harm from war when ongoing death and destruction results in trauma, hopelessness, and the loss of livelihoods (Murthy & Lakshminarayana, 2006).

However, for Xunzi, when war becomes a necessary means to restore social order, standards for military actions should be followed to ensure that war ultimately achieves good ends. These include putting people as the primary concern, monitoring the enemy secretly and in depth so that doubtful military plans are never implemented, and promoting military leaders who displays moral qualities and various skills, such as correct rewarding, punishment, and combat (Xunzi, “Man’s Nature is Evil”, p. 219-234).

In that case, war loses legitimacy if certain rules are not followed so that military action endangers social order or people’s lives. For example, Yu (2016) states that as well as avoiding seizing cities to preclude unnecessary causalities, “when executing military missions…the safety of soldiers should be the first priority” (p. 269). The idea is that by seeking support from the people of the state, war should only ever be used to punish enemies that violate justice and humaneness. Common people, property, and crops even if belonging to the enemy state, should always be protected.

While in theory, Confucian military ethics follows traditional just war ideas where battles should be fought effectively and rightly so as to maintain the trust of the people (Snider et al., 2009), the practice of following these rules in live combat may not be so clear. For example, even though warfare that is necessary to establish peace and stability may be justified under certain conditions in Confucian thought, does the ruler have the right to wage war against rebels who use force to overthrow non-ren rulers?

Further, what does the army do if the ‘enemy’ uses cover and hides amongst the population so that it becomes difficult to distinguish between the enemy and the common people?

Even though early Confucian teachings allow for various reasons for entering wars, it should be noted that these reasons must be specific and people-centered. Soldiers and generals alike are expected to cultivate virtues, and avoid practicing immoral tricks, such as deception (gui, 詭) and deceit (zha, 詐). As Confucius said, ideally people should be lead through moral force (de, 德) where order is kept through rites (li, 礼) – it is only under these conditions that “they will have a sense of shame and will also correct themselves” (2:3).

 

 

Lessons in respect at China’s Confucius kindergartens

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The central government of China is slowly reintroducing Confucianism into China’s education system, particularly through supporting hundreds of private schools dedicated to Confucian teachings.

The teachings of Confucius demand respect for tradition and elders to ensure harmony in a rigidly hierarchical society. Parents are responding optimistically to the traditional education as the children of today’s society are considered too individualistic and selfish.

A new institution in Wuhan especially has been praised for offering young students a program that “counters the downsides of modern life”. The class of 30 students aged two to six chants “Our respect to you, Master Confucius. Thank you for the kindness of your teaching and your compassion”.

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Not only do the students learn to recite the great Confucian classics, recreational activities such as Chinese chess for boys and tea ceremonies for girls are conducted.

From January 2016, The China Confucius Foundation had established around 300 institutions in China, compared with 223,700 ordinary kindergartens. A growth of 700 more institutes is anticipated.

Another Confucian organisation, Tongxueguan, opened its first weekend school in 2006 and now has more than 120 such establishments across the country.

According to the founder of Tongxueguan, Li Guangbin, “After economic prosperity, Chinese feel the need for a return to their roots. They also need spiritual elevation.”

Li continues, “The government needs the Confucian traditions to maintain stability, increase the happiness of people, so that they accept their lot without complaint.”

The complete article can be found here.

Chinese soft power set to overtake the world

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Soft power is a highly influential tool used by countries to persuade others that their culture and values are desirable. The concept is practiced by all countries in some approach, for example America with Hollywood films and South Korea with K-pop. Despite the success soft power can create, it is not coercive and is determined by its ability to appeal and attract others.

China’s Confucius Institutes worldwide are an increasing attempt to spread the cultural values and language among outsiders. However, the tight control of what can be said about human rights or the independence of Taiwan clash, particularly in Australia, with the ideal of freedom of speech and inquiry.

As most of the Western world sees China as somewhat “unfriendly”, China is devoting billions to try and refashion its image.

Chinese President Xi Jinping shares a specific strategy: “To give a good Chinese narrative and better communicate China’s messages to the world. To be portrayed as a civilised place featuring a rich history, with good government and developed economy, cultural prosperity and diversity and beautiful mountains and rivers.”

And by what means? Hollywood.

It is anticipated that by 2018 China will become the world’s biggest box office, overtaking America and doubling before its peak.

Wang Jianlin, the Rupert Murdoch of China, is somewhat responsible as he continues to acquire Hollywood, one piece at a time. So far he has bought Legendary Entertainment, Dick Clark Studios and AMC entertainment from the US, Odeon from Europe and Hoyts in Australia.

With the Oriental Movie Metropolis in Qingdao set to be operational next year and thirty big-budget films in the making, Hollywood producers are now considering the “China Factor” in any future profitability.

Harvard professor Joseph Nye and inventor of the term ‘soft power’ says “China’s soft power has fundamental flaws. ..soft power is usually more successful if it comes from the grass roots and is not a dictated program.”

Professor Nye also believes it will be some time yet before China overtakes America as the dominant global power, so in the meantime, get ready for more Chinese heroes at the movies.

The original article can be found here.

film